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Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup 
I. OVERVIEW 
King Gyanendra's seizure of power and arrest of 
democratic party leaders on 1 February 2005 will likely 
aid the Maoist insurgency and intensify the civil war.1 
But by bringing the crisis to a head he has created an 
opportunity for diplomatic efforts to pull Nepal back from 
the brink of collapse and develop an effective counter-
insurgency strategy. The key countries and organisations 
involved in the country -- India, the U.S., the UK and the 
UN -- need to work together to strengthen a collapsing 
state and establish a plan to deal with the Maoist 
insurgency.2 Acceptance of the coup and lack of action 
would only increase the chances of a Maoist victory and 
a descent into worse violence. 
There is also an urgent human rights crisis in Nepal that 
requires international action. The record on disappearances 
and extra-judicial killings is one of the world's worst. 
Hundreds of political figures and activists have been 
detained, and protests have been violently suppressed. 
An expanded campaign against the Maoists by the Royal 
Nepalese Army (RNA) is likely to result in worsening 
abuses while offering no realistic chance of defeating the 
insurgency or reaching a negotiated solution. At the 
same time, the government is vulnerable to external 
pressure because it is heavily dependent on foreign aid. 
The policy priorities should be: 
 re-establishment of constitutional rule, including 
restoration of all suspended freedoms, release of all 
 
 
1 For more details on the coup see Crisis Group Asia Report 
N°91, Nepal's Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse, 
9 February 2005.  
2 This paper deals with immediate policy steps to strengthen 
the state in order that it can develop a political, economic and 
military strategy to defend itself against a violent insurgency 
and recover the ground it has lost in the last several years. It 
does not address in detail the longer-term issue of how to end 
the Maoist threat, through military means or negotiations, or a 
combination of those two approaches: this will be the subject 
of future Crisis Group reporting. Detailed policy reports will 
also shortly be published on three critical areas for reform -- 
the constitution, political parties and the security sector -- and 
on how best to respond to the current human rights crisis.  
people arrested in the royal crackdown since 1 
February 2005 and revocation of the state of 
emergency; 
 expanded protection of human rights, including 
through full and immediate access to all places 
of detention for the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); 
 a stronger legal framework to protect rights, 
including through repeal of the Terrorism and 
Destructive Activities Ordinance (TADO); 
 re-establishment of democratic institutions and 
strengthening of the state's administrative and 
governance capacity across the country; and 
 a broad-based political, security and socio-economic 
strategy to address not only the insurgency but also 
the underlying issues that have fuelled it. 
To achieve these, donors should immediately implement 
a range of measures to pressure the royal government. 
Instead of vague threats, they should take the following 
steps at once and only lift them when specific conditions 
are met: 
 suspend all military assistance that is not essential 
to maintaining the security status quo;  
 suspend all direct bilateral and multilateral 
budgetary support to the government; 
 initiate a review of all current development 
assistance and prepare plans for phased suspension 
and withdrawal of these programs; 
 signal displeasure with the king's action by 
diplomatic and protocol means (including 
cancellation of visits and invitations); and 
 support a strong resolution on human rights at the 
UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in 
March 2005. 
The best mechanism to coordinate this would be a 
Contact Group bringing together the major powers and 
institutions that have been active in developing a policy 
towards Nepal's conflict. This group might in turn appoint 
a special envoy to advance its agreed political response to 
the coup and the insurgency. It will not be easy to achieve 
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all policy objectives but a demonstrably united 
international front would demand attention in Kathmandu 
and be able to send a strong message to all involved that 
political institutions must be rebuilt if the state is to 
survive the insurgency. If the country's main political 
forces cannot agree on a common agenda, they all stand 
to lose. 
The Contact Group and other donors should make clear 
that they expect the measures demanded to be taken 
immediately and to be sustained. The royal government 
must be judged on its actions rather than its public 
pronouncements. If the initial round of pressure does not 
achieve results, and the king is still unwilling to 
relinquish absolute power, donors should consider: 
 suspending all military aid, including provision 
of spare parts for vehicles and helicopters and 
aviation fuel; 
 suspending all assistance (including development 
assistance) apart from humanitarian aid; 
 introducing targeted sanctions including a freeze 
of the assets of the royal family, senior officials, 
military officers and their families, visa bans and 
suspension of the RNA's lucrative involvement in 
UN peacekeeping operations; and 
 encouraging the Security Council to investigate 
and prosecute both government and Maoist 
suspects who have escaped justice due to Nepal's 
inadequate judicial procedures. 
Should the king still drag his feet, it would be time to 
consider more radical options, including international 
expressions of support for a republic rather than 
constitutional monarchy. Gyanendra may well have 
tipped support within the country decisively toward a 
republic already but he should be offered one last 
chance to agree to policies that would allow the 
Nepali state to respond effectively to the Maoist 
challenge. If he continues on his present course, his 
coup will mark a stage leading to intensified conflict 
and possibly a Maoist victory. 
II. A COUP THAT CANNOT BRING 
PEACE 
A. THE KING'S PLAN 
The king and his new ministers have argued that only a 
strong, authoritarian government can deliver peace. The 
newly appointed deputy premier, Tulsi Giri, argues that 
Nepal is acting no differently than the U.S. after 11 
September 2001: "Every country has a problem which it 
is trying to solve", he said, "but then it's not justice that 
you make comments on how Nepal is dealing with it".3 
How the king might achieve a lasting resolution of the 
conflict is unclear. He may envisage three scenarios but 
none is likely to succeed: 
 Talks. The new Council of Ministers has called for 
negotiations with the Maoists4 but there is no realistic 
prospect. The insurgents' chairman, Prachanda, their 
spokesman, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, and other 
figures have reiterated that they will not deal with 
the king.5 Even if they were to come to the table, 
talks between forces representing the extremes of 
the political spectrum would be unlikely to deliver 
a stable long-term settlement. More probably, the 
Maoists would only use them as a tactical diversion 
and a means for weakening the monarchy further.  
 Military pressure. Even if the generals recognise 
that a knock-out military victory is impossible, many 
of them argue that a sustained offensive would 
weaken the Maoists enough to force them into talks 
without preconditions. But even the "bloody nose" 
objective Indian advisers previously recommended 
is unlikely to be delivered. The army has shown 
little capacity to hurt the rebels, and military experts 
have been unimpressed by its progress in adapting 
to a counterinsurgency campaign. Since its 
deployment in November 2001, the military 
position has progressively weakened, and the RNA 
is now burdened with extra responsibilities which 
will distract it from frontline fighting. State security 
forces, which now have to guard against unrest 
from the political mainstream, will be even less 
likely to win support and develop improved 
intelligence capacity. Moreover, the royal coup 
will likely prove a recruiting boon for the Maoists, 
particularly from disaffected leftist party activists. 
 
 
3 Interview with Reuters quoted in "Dr. Giri stands against 
int'l criticism", Kathmandu Post, 16 February 2005. 
4 A senior minister of the newly formed cabinet has said that 
the government would soon form a team to hold peace 
negotiations with the Maoist insurgents. According to reports, 
Minister for Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation Buddhi Raj 
Bajracharya said that the team would discuss the insurgents' 
demands only after they agree to talks. "The Maoists have 
repeatedly said that they would hold a dialogue with the King 
only. Now, it's the best time for them to come for talks as the 
present government is formed under the chairmanship of His 
Majesty", reports quoted the Minister as saying. Nepalnews.com, 
7 February 2005. 
5 Prachanda's press statement of 12 February 2005 stated 
unambiguously that "the possibility and rationality of 
talks with Gyanendra Shahi has ended in the aftermath of 
[his] murdering of achievements of [the 1990 democracy 
movement]". 
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 Maoist collapse. Ever since the Maoists' plenary 
meeting in August 2004, Kathmandu government 
and diplomatic circles have been buzzing with talk 
of serious splits within their leadership. Many 
analysts hope that such internal tensions will fatally 
divide the movement. But similar speculation has 
frequently proved groundless. The Maoists do have 
differences over strategy but they remain disciplined 
and united. Indeed, they encourage a "two-line 
struggle" within the party as a way of developing 
policy.6 As long as they feel they have momentum, 
serious splits are not likely. Attempts to "decapitate" 
the insurgency by arresting or killing key leaders 
would at best entrench local warlords and groups 
rather than produce a total collapse. Moreover, a 
negotiated settlement -- the goal of any realistic 
strategy -- would be far easier to reach with a 
unified Maoist leadership than a series of regional 
splinter movements. 
There have been suggestions that the king's move is 
popular in Nepal, but there is no evidence for such claims. 
If the move were truly popular, it would not seem to 
have been necessary for the king to impose draconian 
restrictions on the media and communications, with many 
of the most vocal critics jailed and others intimidated into 
silence. The king marked Democracy Day on 19 February 
2005 by having schoolchildren bused in to celebrate 
while public transport was banned and phone lines cut to 
prevent demonstrations by political parties. 
The only two recent large scale, professional surveys of 
Nepali popular opinion in the last year both indicate a 
popular preference for a constitutional monarchy and 
extremely limited support for an absolute monarchy. A 
July 2004 nationwide poll found that 60 per cent of 
respondents favour a democracy with a constitutional 
monarchy, 17 per cent democracy without a monarchy; 
9 percent a return to the Panchayat system, and only 2 
per cent an absolute monarchy.7 Of 3,249 respondents to 
a nationwide survey carried out in August and September 
2004, 62 per cent said that "democracy is always 
preferable to any other form of government" while only 
10 per cent thought authoritarianism was acceptable.8 
 
 
6 The "two-line struggle" is a term used by the Maoists to 
refer to internal debates. Mao regarded it as an inevitable 
aspect of revolutionary work to be encouraged. 
7 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research Inc., "Faith in 
Democracy Endures, In Spite of Disappointments: Report on 
the Baseline Survey and Focus Groups", Washington, 16 
August 2004, p. 6. 
8 The study was coordinated by the Lokniti wing of Centre for 
the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), New Delhi and 
supported by International IDEA. A summary of its findings is 
available on IDEA's website, http://www.idea.int. Their 
relevance in the post-coup context is discussed in detail by 
B. STRONGER MAOISTS, WEAKER STATE 
The immediate political impact of the royal coup is 
almost entirely negative in terms of the state response to 
the Maoist challenge. While royalist claims that Nepal 
needs a strong hand on the helm may sound reasonable 
from a distance, the reality is that the king's actions have 
dramatically destabilised the ship of state. An authoritarian 
grip on the levers of power means little when the 
government's writ barely extends beyond Kathmandu 
and a few other urban areas. 
The assault on democratic parties and institutions 
strengthens the Maoists and increases the likelihood that 
the mainstream parties will join the rebels in a loose 
alliance against the king.9 However such an alliance is 
structured, the fact that the Maoists are not only the best 
organised and most determined political force in the 
country but also armed and violent gives them excellent 
chances to control it. They will seek to co-opt other 
parties and use them to achieve their long-standing 
goals. The chances that this could result in some form of 
Maoist victory have been greatly increased. 
The Maoists almost certainly believe that their 
analysis of Nepali society and their strategy of 
protracted war have been vindicated. They had long 
hoped that their opponents would eventually be 
reduced to a royalist rump with a limited support base 
and they will interpret moves within mainstream 
parties towards republicanism as evidence of growing 
support. The first indications in the aftermath of the 
coup suggest that the king's actions have pushed even 
some hitherto staunch monarchists toward a 
republican position.10 While the king would gain 
 
 
Yogendra Yadav, "Nepalis want democracy, not monarchy", 
The Hindu, 3 February 2005 (available at http://www.hindu.com/ 
2005/02/03/stories/2005020314261100.htm). 
9 The Maoist press statement of 4 February called for "all the 
pro-people political forces, civil society, intellectual community 
and all the level and sphere of people" to form a united front 
"to overthrow feudal autocracy". The Maoists added, "We 
would also like to clarify to all those concerned that we are 
utterly ready for necessary sacrifice and flexibility from our 
side for this purpose". 
10 Sujata Koirala, daughter of Congress leader Girija Prasad 
Koirala and a senior party leader herself, says that the 
monarchy has now lost the confidence of the people 
("Escaped Daughter of Ex-Premier Says King Ruling by 
Terror", Inter Press Service, 13 February 2005). Congress 
Central Committee member Krishna Prasad Sitaula has 
stated that his party is "even ready to join hands with the 
Maoists to put an end to the monarchy" ("Nepali Congress 
may join hands with Maoist rebels", Press Trust of India, 8 
February 2005). Moderate voices may find it hard to make 
themselves heard: due to the coup the Nepali Congress has 
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credit for any dramatic progress in the conflict, the 
institution of the monarchy is no longer shielded from 
political failure. What support, or tacit consent, it has 
gained or held on to can be expected to evaporate 
rapidly if there are serious economic, political or 
security setbacks. 
Far from reassuring the public at large, the RNA has yet 
to ensure its own security in the face of Maoist attacks. 
There are precious few indications that the battle for 
hearts and minds has been joined at all, let alone won. 
Many troops are tied down guarding essential 
infrastructure such as telecommunications installations, 
power stations, government offices and major highways, 
while others now have taken on extra duties such as 
censoring the media, detaining political opponents and 
becoming more involved in administrative affairs at the 
central and district level. Faced with managing potential 
civil unrest from both the centre and the hard left, it 
could rapidly find itself overstretched. There is also a 
long-term risk of the growing militarisation of society. 
Once armies get a taste for power and control of 
resources, they tend to be reluctant to relinquish them.  
On 13 February 2005 (the ninth anniversary of the start 
of their armed campaign) the Maoists launched a 
program of indefinite blockades, which has further 
challenged the state's capacity to respond. All indications 
are that these have been largely successful. Little traffic 
has used the main highways, even though the Maoists 
have not attempted to enforce them by direct military 
action.11 "It's remarkable that there's no panic yet in 
Kathmandu", commented a western diplomat. "All the 
information we have suggests that the blockade could 
soon make life in the capital very difficult".12 
The government's credibility and capacity, meanwhile, 
is at an all time low. The post-coup regime has no 
constitutional legitimacy and doubtful ability to implement 
any program. The first meeting of the Council of Ministers 
announced a ludicrously overambitious 21-point plan, 
including construction of an east-west railway, full 
employment and educational scholarships for minorities. 
It was not revealed how an impoverished country facing 
a liquidity crisis would pay for this.13 Delivery of 
 
 
indefinitely postponed its 11th General Convention which 
had been scheduled to take place in early March. 
11 Even the censored Nepali media has recognised the 
seriousness of the blockades: "Even as the authorities have 
assured of security and have even provided escorts to 
vehicles coming to and leaving the capital, Kathmandu, 
traffic along major highways remains very low since last few 
days." ("Air ticket sales soar as blockades continue", 
nepalnews.com, 23 February 2005) 
12 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 23 February 2005. 
13 The Kathmandu Post has estimated that the government 
government services depends on the geographical reach 
of the state and a capable bureaucracy. But the withdrawal 
of most local government from the countryside -- 
already well underway before the coup -- is now being 
exacerbated by the army's intervention in civilian affairs, 
a move more likely to damage morale among civil 
servants than improve efficiency.14 
C. A HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS 
For the civilians who are the primary victims of the 
conflict, the coup is likely to herald further miseries as 
the already dire human rights situation deteriorates 
further. The passing reference to respect for rights made 
by the king in his proclamation was ambivalent: "all the 
organs of the state must remain alert in honouring and 
upholding human rights. However, it will be unfair to 
put the state and terrorists on equal footing". Signs of an 
atmosphere of even greater impunity for the security 
forces have appeared with regularity since the coup. For 
example, the first attempts to lodge habeas corpus writs 
were unsuccessful; soldiers prevented National Human 
Rights Commissioner Kapil Shrestha from leaving the 
Kathmandu valley; prominent rights activists such as 
Krishna Pahari and Gauri Pradhan have been detained as 
has been Professor Lok Raj Baral, a respected academic 
and former ambassador to India; peaceful pamphleteers 
and demonstrators have been picked up off the streets of 
Kathmandu. The most reliable estimate is that 385 
political leaders or activists and 35 human rights 
defenders have been detained since 1 February.15 
 
 
now needs to mobilise an extra 32.31 billion rupees 
(approximately $450 million) if it is to meet its planned 
expenditure of Rs115.29 billion rupees ($1.6 billion) for the 
fiscal year 2004--2005 ("Will Nepal meet the resource gap?", 
24 February 2005). Nepal's foreign currency reserves of $1.7 
billion may not be sufficient to withstand a severe liquidity 
crunch, especially if there is a further reduction in foreign 
tourism and any disruption to vital remittance income 
("Coping with coup", Sunday Express, 6 February 2005; 
available at http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php? 
content _id=64159). 
14 "The security forces have stepped up monitoring of 
government offices providing direct services to general public 
since Monday. On the first day, the security team is reported to 
have launched sudden inspection of Passport Department, Land 
Revenue Department, Kathmandu District Administration 
Office and Transport Management Office in the valley. Royal 
Nepalese Army (RNA) spokesman Brigadier General Deepak 
Gurung said that the army had to step up monitoring of the 
government offices after commoners had lodged complaints 
against these offices". "Security forces start monitoring govt. 
offices", www.kantipuronline.com, 8 February 2005. 
15 Asian Human Rights Commission, "UPDATE (Nepal): 
Additional lists of arrested political leaders/activists and 
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The prospects for further bloodshed, as and when the 
RNA can spare the units for offensive action, seem 
great. Indications from within the military are that it is 
annoyed at the failure of "C"-type cordons, is preparing 
to shift to "O"-type encirclement and engagement, and 
will launch operations on the principle of "full destroy". 
These new tactics explicitly recognise that civilian 
casualties are both likely and acceptable. Already reports 
from Morang district suggest that a major "encounter" 
between the army and Maoists has resulted in the deaths 
of at least three schoolchildren. With no freedom for 
investigation and reporting of such incidents the potential 
for abuses and the sense of impunity are greatly increased. 
III. WHAT CAN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY DO? 
A. THE PRIORITIES 
International policy on Nepal has failed. Quiet diplomacy 
and support for the king have not worked. Since 2002, 
the main players -- India, the U.S., and the UK -- have 
been urging the king to work with the political parties to 
develop a common political strategy toward the Maoists. 
The EU has taken a similar stance. Peace-building efforts 
such as the creation of a secretariat to advance a 
negotiated settlement and the provision of technical 
conflict management expertise have not been backed by 
adequate political will. Instead, and despite repeated 
warnings from all sides, the king has seized power, and 
the situation has worsened significantly. Acceptance of 
the present course would lead to further instability and 
hasten a possible takeover by the Maoists. 
The first international reaction to the coup was strong16 
but there is a risk that as the days go by the situation may 
appear to normalise, and accepting the new status quo 
could become the line of least resistance. The king and 
his advisers were certainly surprised by the extent of 
negative reaction, not least Indian refusal to attend the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) summit at which Gyanendra had hoped to 
appear as Nepal's head of government.17 But they are 
prepared to weather a brief storm of protest. Palace 
officials brushed off the stern Indian statement on the 
 
 
human rights defenders", 23 February 2005, available at 
http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2005/959. 
16 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal's Royal Coup, op. cit. 
17 The decision of India's prime minister not to take part in the 
SAARC meeting scheduled to be held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 
in effect resulted in its cancellation since the SAARC charter 
provides that summits may only be held if the head of state or 
government of each member state attends. 
coup with the comment that "Nehru said exactly the same 
things in 1960 [when King Mahendra dismissed an elected 
government and seized power]. But he came round soon 
enough". Palace emissaries have been making open 
comparisons with General Pervez Musharraf's seizure of 
power in Pakistan and subsequent rehabilitation by the 
international community.18 
The international community as a whole has little 
enthusiasm for close involvement with Nepal's troubles. 
Most countries have long hoped that India, its most 
influential neighbour, would play a more active role in 
ensuring stability in its backyard. While the severity of 
Nepal's situation has slowly dawned on the outside world, 
and the precariousness of its state institutions are now a 
matter of wider concern, it is all too likely that attention 
will dwindle rapidly, and the policy drift that has 
accompanied Nepal's slide towards state failure will 
continue.  
However, the goals of Nepal's friends and neighbours 
are similar: they want a peaceful, stable, prosperous and 
democratic Nepal, and they want to avert a violent 
Maoist takeover. Immediate policy priorities, therefore, 
are easy to identify: 
 re-establishment of constitutional rule: restoration 
of all suspended freedoms, release of all those 
arrested in the royal crackdown since 1 February 
2005 and an end to the state of emergency; 
 expanded protection of human rights not only 
through the signing and full implementation of 
the NHRC's Human Rights Accord but also by 
immediately providing full access to all places of 
detention for the NHRC and the ICRC; and 
 development of a stronger legal framework to 
protect rights through the repeal of the Terrorism 
 
 
18 For example, they say the idea of cutting all phone 
communications was borrowed from the Pakistani coup. There 
are clear differences between the situations in the two countries, 
however. The RNA and the Palace lack the institutional capacity 
to run the state that the Pakistani military has built up over 
many decades. International support for Musharraf has been in 
exchange for his cooperation on terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation and because of an exaggerated concern that the 
Pakistan state is under threat from Islamic extremists. Nor is 
Pakistan a good model for Nepal of economic, political or 
security management. Tensions are rising across Pakistan; it 
remains severely under-developed; reforms to areas such as 
education have faltered; jihadism has not been effectively 
tackled, and the military looks unlikely to leave power any 
time soon. It is notable that General Musharraf also justified 
his coup on the grounds of corruption and the ineffectual 
nature of political parties. After several years of military rule, 
Pakistan is no less corrupt. See Crisis Group's extensive 
reporting on Pakistan at www.crisisgroup.org. 
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and Destructive Activities Ordinance (TADO), 
signature of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions and full implementation of the 
international instruments to which Nepal is already 
a party. 
B. PRESSURE POINTS 
These policies are most likely to succeed if preceded by 
the judicious application of pressure on the royal 
government. Certain effective actions have already been 
taken. Most significantly, India has cut off military aid 
and the UK has suspended delivery of a planned new 
package of military assistance.19 India has also surprised 
the palace with the force of its diplomatic reaction: 
blocking the king from obtaining recognition at the 
SAARC summit, postponing the Indian army chief's 
scheduled visit to Kathmandu, and strong public 
statements. The coordinated recall of the Indian, 
American and all EU ambassadors has also sent a 
clear signal. The Danish government has suspended all 
development aid. But international reaction should utilise 
a wider range of pressure points. In each area there are 
both measures that should be taken immediately and 
stronger ones that can be held in reserve in case results 
are not forthcoming. 
1. Non-military assistance 
Nepal is heavily dependent on foreign aid. Most 
development work is funded by outsiders. Essential 
humanitarian assistance must be continued but much 
development aid has been thrown into doubt by the 
royal coup. Donors who work with and through the 
government had already been concerned by its lack of 
capacity to implement programs. Many experts on the 
ground now expect the development environment will 
make most programs unviable. 
 First round: 
(i) freeze of all direct budgetary support to the 
government;  
 
 
19 "India Freezes Arms Aid to Nepal", Statesman, 22 February 
2005. "British Government Suspends Military Support to 
Nepal", statement by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, 22 February 
2005. The package included night flying capability and 
communications enhancements to Short Take Off and Landing 
surveillance aircraft previously provided, 40 general purpose 
Land Rovers and Explosive Ordnance Disposal equipment and 
vehicles. Straw said the UK was "now considering with key 
international partners what our longer term policy for providing 
assistance to Nepal should be, including on assistance with a 
humanitarian purpose". It appears that India's freeze is more 
comprehensive than the UK's: Britain has not so far suspended 
military training. 
(ii) no new agreements with the international 
financial institutions (IFIs);  
(iii) no new bilateral or multilateral development 
aid agreements;  
(iv) review all other development assistance and 
draw up plans for a phased suspension and 
withdrawal. 
 Second round: suspend all development assistance 
channelled through the government. 
2. Diplomatic action 
Concerted diplomatic action can yield results but only if 
it sets realistic benchmarks and applies pressure that will 
be felt in Kathmandu. The international community has 
not been taken seriously in the past: for example, the 
Nepal government's commitment letter and the Chair's 
statement at the 2004 UN Commission on Human 
Rights did not lead to any improvements in the human 
rights situation. Donors could easily assert much greater 
authority if they made clear that Nepal will face intense 
scrutiny in all possible international arenas and will be 
judged on action and implementation not words. 
 First round:  
(i) support a strong Item 9 resolution at the 
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva;20 
(ii) cancel pending official visits by Nepali 
officials;  
(iii) restrict attendance at government functions 
and all non-essential meetings by Kathmandu-
based diplomats. 
 Second round:  
(i) reduce diplomatic ties;  
(ii) in the case of lack of improvement in the 
human rights situation, start preparing a 
security council decision with respect to 
investigation and prosecution of possible 
war crimes;21  
 
 
20 Item 9 refers to the agenda item of the Human Rights 
Commission's annual meeting in Geneva under which 
countries can raise concerns about "Human Rights in the 
World". It provides a flexible opportunity for members of 
the commission to raise emergency human rights situations. 
21 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour 
raised the possibility of such investigations and prosecutions 
during her visit to Nepal in January 2005, shortly before the 
royal coup, Nepal is not a signatory to the Rome Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) but the 
Security Council could authorise that Court to exercise 
jurisdiction similar to what is currently under discussion with 
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(iii) suspend participation of Nepali troops, police 
officers, civil servants, etc. in UN peacekeeping 
missions. 
3. Military assistance 
The RNA is heavily dependent on foreign assistance for 
both its operations and prestige and, therefore, should be 
vulnerable to pressure to change both the king's policies 
and the disastrous human rights environment that 
has done so much to reduce the effectiveness of the 
counterinsurgency. While Nepal ultimately requires 
outside aid to maintain an effective military, the RNA 
has enough weaponry, ammunition and equipment to 
maintain its current level of activity against the Maoists 
for at least the next few months. A suspension of 
military assistance would not, therefore, create a military 
emergency in the short-term but it would make the RNA 
think hard about where its interests lie and probably 
prevent the launching of an offensive that would result 
in substantial civilian casualties while it was doing that 
thinking.  
Military prestige is very much invested in contacts with 
foreign militaries. Overseas service with UN peacekeeping 
operations is a lucrative source of income for top military 
officials and a point of pride. All future military assistance 
should be conditioned on human rights improvements 
and the army's non-interference in politics.  
 First round:  
(i) freeze all military aid that is not essential to 
maintaining the security status quo;22  
 
 
respect to the situation in the Darfur area of Sudan. The U.S., 
which objects to the ICC, has opposed such a referral on 
Darfur and supports the use of an ad hoc tribunal.  
22 As noted above, India, which is the RNA's most important 
supplier, and the UK, which is third, after the U.S., have 
already announced measures that appear to go at least this far. 
Military aid has only had a limited impact on the state's capacity 
to maintain security. More weapons have intensified the conflict 
without improving security and much materiel has fallen into 
Maoist hands. There may be practical difficulties in determining 
what aid is essential and what is non-essential, but the 
practical rule of thumb would be that RNA capacities should 
not be increased. Thus while resupply of a certain level of 
ammunition or other supplies could be justified, increases in 
those supplies or new or improved systems would not be. 
There might be legitimate differences about what assistance 
should be allowed because it is already well into the pipeline. 
Again, the bottom line should be whether the impact would 
essentially be to allow the RNA to hold present lines or 
whether it would be to encourage it to attempt offensive 
action. Potential military donors should also consider that 
unlimited supplies have only encouraged the RNA to engage in 
unproductive, indiscriminate free-fire fights. Limiting its 
(ii) provide no new military aid pending review;  
(iii) suspend international contacts, army-to-army 
ties, officer training courses, etc.;  
(iv) review the RNA's current involvement in 
UN peacekeeping options and have the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
prepare plans for replacing currently 
deployed forces. 
 Second round:  
(i) suspend all military assistance;  
(ii) suspend all participation of RNA soldiers in 
UN peacekeeping operations;  
(iii) target sanctions (visa ban) on all senior 
RNA officers and their families. 
4. The palace 
By seizing power, the king has placed himself at the 
centre of any diplomatic action. Polite demarches will 
not resolve this problem. The king and those around him 
are vulnerable to a number of forms of pressure, some of 
which have already been exerted. Protocol restrictions 
are an obvious starting point, although a flexible approach 
needs to be maintained to allow some communication to 
facilitate a solution. It is not known what assets the king 
has outside the country but he has large business interests 
including a hotel, a tea estate, and stakes in other 
companies inside Nepal, which link him to members of 
the Kathmandu elite who have encouraged him to seize 
power. The Nepali elite is cosmopolitan and well-
connected to the outside world and therefore vulnerable 
to smart sanctions. 
 First round:  
(i) limits on international contacts, restrict 
diplomatic attendance at royal or palace 
functions, withdrawal of travel and social 
invitations to royal family and close relatives;  
(ii) investigate royal and other overseas assets, 
including bank accounts, property and business 
interests, and draw up plans for asset-freeze. 
 Second round:  
(i) blacklisting of palace-owned or crony 
businesses and their senior staff;  
(ii) visa and travel ban for members of the royal 
family and the royal government; 
(iii) freeze royal assets overseas. 
 
 
supplies as well would not only send an important signal but 
might also improve RNA tactics.  
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C. AN INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM 
"The king just doesn't listen to us -- what can we do?", 
has become a standard refrain of ambassadors in 
Kathmandu, who even before the coup were frustrated 
at their inability to persuade the king to follow their 
governments' advice.  
A major hindrance to successful international pressure 
has been the diversity of diplomatic voices. While the 
major players -- most notably India, the U.S. and UK -- 
have frequently cooperated and agreed on the basic line 
that there is no obvious military solution to the conflict, 
successive Nepali governments have proved adept at 
shrugging off advice. The palace has calculated that 
political indecision will allow its coup to succeed 
regardless of the chorus of public disapproval. But hand-
wringing does not have to be the only response to this 
dangerous situation. The key players should organise to 
deliver their messages more effectively. 
1. Forming a Contact Group 
If the international community is to play an effective 
role in helping rescue Nepal from its political crisis and 
working towards the resolution of its long-running 
conflict, it must speak with a strong single voice. For 
this it needs a suitable mechanism. The best would be a 
Contact Group that brings together at least New Delhi, 
Washington, and London as well as the UN.  
The group could appoint a senior envoy with stature, 
experience and a mandate to devote considerable time to 
serious talks in Kathmandu and other capitals.23 Even 
without a special envoy, the group could formalise the 
coordination of policy in a way that sends a clear 
message to Kathmandu. 
2. Members and their positions 
Contact Groups have played a significant role in the 
international response to other conflicts.24 But composition 
and mandate raise certain questions. When major powers 
are already coordinating their policies what advantages 
would a formal grouping bring? Why should certain 
nations and intergovernmental bodies be a part of it and 
others not? What scope would the group and its envoy 
 
 
23 Such an envoy would not necessarily have to come from 
one of the Contact Group member countries. 
24 Two current prominent Contact Groups deal with the 
Middle East (the Quartet) and Kosovo. Others have operated 
during and after the war in Bosnia and during the Liberia 
Crisis. Contact Groups are informal, ad hoc groupings that do 
not require a UN Security Council mandate and can set their 
own modus operandi. 
have for diplomatic engagement and what weight would 
it carry? 
The primary aim of forming such a group for the Nepal 
crisis would be to make the adoption of a common 
policy explicit and to reaffirm to all players in the 
country that they will gain no advantage by seeking to 
play one power against another. The most difficult 
immediate issue on which to reach agreement would be 
the aid question, especially military aid. Ultimately 
Contact Group members would also need to coordinate 
their views on negotiations with the Maoists about 
which they have at least nuanced differences.25 However 
great their cooperation to date, diplomats have admitted 
that their sustained efforts to use gentle persuasion have 
ended in failure. A single group with a high-profile 
envoy would stand a far greater chance of having its 
messages heard and acted on. 
The composition of the group would be crucial. It would 
not be a group of equals but rather a loose alliance of 
interested and influential parties, consisting of three 
states and the UN. The positions and interests of its 
members are outlined below. 
India. India sees Nepal as part of its sphere of 
influence and has a unique relationship with it under 
the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship.26 India 
asserts, with justification, that other nations may seek 
to influence Nepal but none is equally exposed to the 
effect of instability there. India is also the main 
supplier of military assistance though, as noted, one 
of its first reactions to the coup was to announce the 
suspension of that assistance.  
While Delhi has been deeply concerned by the royal 
coup, it faces difficulties in taking policy steps since its 
diplomats are well aware that any intervention runs the 
risk of raising Nepal's nationalist hackles and leading to 
unwanted side-effects. A Contact Group would afford it 
key opportunities that are otherwise unattainable: (i) a 
degree of external assistance to Nepal in the resolution 
of its conflict without ceding decision-making powers to 
any third party; (ii) the chance to shape international 
policy without being branded a bullying big brother. 
Moreover, a mature and cooperative role in such a 
multilateral grouping could boost Delhi's claim to a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  
 
 
25 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal's Royal Coup, op. cit. 
26 For a text of the treaty see: http://www.insof.org/treaty/280 
41960_Sino-Nepalese_Treaty.htm. It provides for an open 
border, gives citizens the right to work in the other country, 
and establishes India's right to veto Nepali arms deals with 
third countries. 
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India has been reluctant to consider third party mediation 
between the political forces in Kathmandu and the 
Maoists, saying this would legitimise the insurgents. 
But it may be somewhat more amenable to an 
international role in settling the political dispute in 
Kathmandu that the king's coup has sharpened.27  
U.S. Washington has been a staunch supporter of 
successive Nepali governments' efforts to tackle the 
Maoist insurgency and has given the RNA significant 
military aid. Although criticised as a hawkish backer of 
a tough security response to the insurgency, the U.S. has 
long recognised, at least in its rhetoric, that a military 
solution is impossible. Recent legislation that predates 
the coup tied its military assistance to better observance 
of human rights by both the RNA and the government,28 
and its response to the king's action has been one of 
dismay. Its calls for immediate restoration of constitutional 
freedoms and democratic institutions would be amplified 
by a united Contact Group.  
U.S. reluctance to cut off aid may be driven by a fear that 
this would only embolden the Maoists but senior officials 
are aware that military pressure has failed to yield results 
so far and there is little chance of that changing in the 
near future. U.S. officials say there is no lethal military 
equipment in the pipeline for delivery before May or 
June,29 which gives them a window in which to 
coordinate policy on this issue with the Indians and 
British. This is important because Delhi would likely 
react strongly should Washington move into a vacuum 
and reduce significantly the RNA's dependence on it for 
most of its needs.  
 
 
27 Crisis Group interview with Indian official. New Delhi. 
January 2005. 
28 Section 590 (C) of the omnibus appropriations act passed in 
December 2004 (P.L. 108-447) provides that: "(2) Funds 
appropriated under the heading `Foreign Military Financing 
Program' may be made available for assistance for Nepal if the 
Secretary of State reports to the Committees on Appropriations 
that the Government of Nepal: (A) has determined the number 
of and is making substantial progress in complying with habeas 
corpus orders issued by the Supreme Court of Nepal, including 
all outstanding orders; (B) is cooperating with the National 
Human Rights Commission of Nepal to identify and resolve all 
security related cases involving individuals in government 
custody; (C) is granting the National Human Rights 
Commission of Nepal unimpeded access to all places of 
detention; and (D) is taking effective steps to end torture by 
security forces and to prosecute members of such forces who 
are responsible for gross violations of human rights. (3) The 
Secretary of State may waive the requirements of paragraph (2) 
if he determines and reports to the Committees on 
Appropriations that to do so is in the national security interests 
of the United States". 
29 Crisis Group interview, Washington, February 2005. 
UK. London's diplomatic ties with Nepal date back to 
the expansion of the British East India Company in the 
eighteenth century and have remained close because of 
the recruitment of Gurkha soldiers and a large aid 
program. Although the European Union has started to 
take a more active political interest in Nepal -- as shown 
by the visit of a high-level troika in mid-December 2004 
-- the UK has been much more willing to play a leading 
role in the international response, especially since it 
organised an international conference on the conflict in 
Nepal in 2002. The UK also has good links to Delhi and 
Washington. The UK has provided some limited military 
assistance including helicopters but it announced on 22 
February 2005 that it is suspending planned delivery of a 
package of further non-lethal equipment worth £1.34 
million.30  
The UN. The UN is widely respected in Nepal, which is 
proud of its reputation as an active member state and 
contributor of peace-keeping forces, but the world 
body's large in-country presence has traditionally been 
heavily development oriented, with the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) as the lead agency. 
Secretary General Kofi Annan has on several occasions 
expressed concern about the conflict and offered his 
good offices in any peace process. The Department of 
Political Affairs has been monitoring the situation and 
has built good relations with key political players. High-
profile visits by special rapporteurs and the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights have focused domestic 
and international attention on urgent problems. But the 
UN has held back from a more proactive political role in 
searching for a resolution and has been wary of declaring 
a humanitarian crisis prematurely. A Contact Group 
would allow it to contribute expertise in areas such as 
human rights, humanitarian affairs and conflict resolution.  
Other nations. A number of other countries also could 
play important roles, albeit not within the Contact Group 
itself. While China is generally not keen to comment 
directly on Nepal's internal politics, it could use UN 
participation in the Contact Groups as a channel to 
exercise indirect influence. The EU and many of its 
member states, Japan, Canada Norway, Switzerland and 
Australia are donors and could form a valuable bloc to 
help the Contact Group maintain momentum. Other 
members of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation would be indirectly represented by the 
UN and should be pleased to see India engaging in 
multilateral diplomacy. 
 
 
30 See footnote 19 above.  
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D. A REFORM PLAN AND VISION OF THE 
FUTURE 
Nepal is a failing state in no shape to reverse a violent 
insurgency on its own. The international community needs 
to help the country reverse the setbacks of the last nine 
years and put it in a position to negotiate a viable long-
term settlement. Rebuilding the state cannot be a matter 
of resorting to the status quo ante that allowed Nepal to 
get into this position. There needs to be a forceful and 
far-sighted agenda for change. Some elements of such 
an agenda are political steps that could be achieved with 
little financial cost and would require few state resources. 
Others will have to be more long term and require, at 
minimum, a re-direction of international assistance. Some 
reforms will need to co-opt ideas from the Maoists: this 
should not been seen as granting concessions to a rebel 
group but as a sensible way to deal with the deep 
problems of Nepali society that the insurgency feeds off. 
The immediate policy changes demanded of the royal 
government, such as the restoration of civil liberties and 
freeing of political prisoners arrested since the coup, 
must be only the prelude for a wider program of reform. 
The re-establishment of democratic institutions should 
be the basis for strengthening the state and restoring the 
population's faith in it. Elected representatives at all 
levels are the only means of making administration and 
governance responsive to people's needs and presenting 
a political challenge to the Maoists.  
The next government must then develop a broad-based 
political, security and socio-economic strategy to address 
the insurgency and the underlying issues that have fuelled 
it. The political challenge will be to sell to Nepal's people 
a vision of the future that inspires confidence and 
support. Making this vision reality will require political 
leadership of a calibre far above that exhibited by recent 
governments. In the absence of inspirational and capable 
statesmen and women, Nepal's friends in the international 
community will have to shoulder much of the 
responsibility for acting as guardians to a sustained 
reform process. 
No outsiders should dictate the form of Nepal's political 
institutions, and it is not the case that only one model 
will work. Nevertheless, certain areas will clearly have 
to be reformed. The sections below indicate some of the 
challenges. 
1. Constitutional reforms 
The 1990 Constitution has created neither a functioning 
constitutional monarchy nor an effective democracy. A 
document is needed that removes certain ambiguities 
about royal power, particularly those centred around 
Article 127, which the king has exploited in the past 
several years to remove prime ministers and justify the 
current coup.31 At the moment the most effective 
mechanism of constitutional reform would be an 
agreement among all mainstream parties to reconstitute 
parliament with a limited mandate to change the 
constitution to ensure: 
 limited royal powers that do not include the right 
to oust governments; 
 civilian control over the military; 
 the constitutional primacy of parliament (around 
which there is currently ambiguity); and 
 greater flexibility to deal with caste and ethnic 
inequalities. 
These changes would do much to undermine the Maoist 
agenda. The door should be left open for further 
constitutional change as needed; indeed the parliament 
might also lay out a timetable for further discussion and 
revisions over a five or ten- year period. 
2. Political Party Reforms 
Nepal's political parties have done much to damage 
support for democracy. Internal reforms are needed 
urgently if they are to reclaim any of their lost 
legitimacy. The establishment of a royal commission on 
corruption provides cover for the king's undermining of 
democratic leaders but it is the failure of successive 
governments to control corruption that has made the 
stick with which they are now being beaten. Carrying 
out reforms while their very existence is under threat 
will not be easy but parties will need to: 
 hold free and fair leadership elections (where 
security will allow) so that members can choose 
their leaders and possibly bring up a new generation;  
 deliver on public commitments to tackle corruption 
and cooperate fully with any legitimate judicial 
investigations; 
 
 
31 Article 127 of the Constitution states: "Power to Remove 
Difficulties: If any difficulty arises in connection with the 
implementation of this Constitution, His Majesty may issue 
necessary orders to remove such difficulty and such orders 
shall be laid before parliament". The language is imprecise but 
it is clear that the king has never laid any order before 
parliament. Rule without elections clearly goes against the 
spirit and language of the Constitution that states: "We are 
convinced that the source of sovereign authority of the 
independent and sovereign Nepal is inherent in the people, and 
therefore, we have from time to time, made known our desire 
to conduct the government of the country in consonance with 
the popular will".  
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 develop, with international assistance, mechanisms 
to allow greater transparency on party financing, 
the assets of party leaders and internal promotions; 
and 
 develop mechanisms to make themselves more 
representative of the wider population, including 
encouraging greater leadership roles for lower 
castes (dalits), ethnic minority members and 
women. 
3. Undercutting the Maoist Agenda 
It is worth remembering that many of the Maoists' 
original 40 demands have been accepted by almost all 
politicians as reasonable.32 If action had been taken 
earlier to address them -- not least the issues of 
economic, regional, caste and ethnic disparity which 
have helped the rebel cause attract recruits -- the 
insurgency would have been unlikely to gain as much 
ground as it has. The next government should: 
 develop, in consultation with all parties and civil 
society, an economic blueprint for Nepal, 
including not only domestic issues such as land 
reform but measures to regulate and benefit from 
the growing remittance economy; 
 take firm measures to outlaw discrimination on 
the grounds of caste, ethnicity, gender, regional or 
linguistic origin, and the like and to develop a 
cohesive sense of national belonging based on 
inclusion in political and administrative processes, 
education and employment, and economic 
development; and 
 reform the judicial system so that people feel they 
have access to even-handed justice and are no 
longer tempted to abandon the courts in favour of 
the Maoists' "people's courts". 
4. Effective Security and Human Rights 
The RNA has no likelihood of stemming the insurgency 
as long as people feel trapped between two violent 
forces. Until it recognises that human rights protection is 
a central aspect of any counter-insurgency strategy, it 
stands no chance of reversing the Maoist gains. Its lack 
of local support and its failure to develop effective 
intelligence about the Maoists can be linked to its abuses 
of human rights. It is not enough to point to Maoist 
violence as a justification for more abuses by the RNA. 
Priorities include: 
 
 
32 For the list of Maoist demands see: http://www.insof.org/ 
politics/130299_40demands_Maoist.htm. 
 signing and implementing the Human Rights 
Accord,33 thus bringing pressure on the Maoists 
to do the same; 
 enabling the National Human Rights Commission 
to carry out its mandate in full and encouraging it 
to accept as much UN assistance as necessary to 
boost domestic capacity; and 
 addressing the urgent need for phased security 
sector reform: apart from the question of civilian 
control, the military needs to be further 
professionalised (with, for example, promotion 
on the basis of ability rather than family ties) and 
to hand over responsibility for law and order to a 
strengthened civilian police force that can win 
the trust of local communities. 
If reforms such as these are embarked upon promptly 
Nepal stands a good chance of facing up to the challenges 
of the Maoist insurgency and avoiding becoming a 
"failed state". An approach that recognises and addresses 
weaknesses in state structures and governance is much 
more likely to defeat the Maoists politically and build a 
sustainable future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although King Gyanendra has said he will be bring 
peace to Nepal, this is unlikely to happen unless his 
coup is reversed. The Nepali state should be dealing 
with the insurgency through combined political and 
security strategies that could bring the Maoists to the 
table and forge a lasting peace. This will not happen 
with a military strategy alone. The first steps taken by 
Nepal and the international community should focus on 
the political situation in Kathmandu rather than the 
conflict with the Maoists. Only when a strategy can be 
agreed on and implemented by all democratic political 
forces in Kathmandu will talks with the Maoists be 
possible that stand any chance of success. 
This is not the time to adopt a "wait and see" strategy. 
The 100 days for the king to prove himself being 
talked of by the U.S. -- which, as noted above, does 
not have to take decisions on its next round of 
military aid until May 2005 -- is too long. Every 
indication is that the situation will deteriorate day by 
day, and the Maoists will be the prime beneficiaries. 
The international community has had more than two 
 
 
33 The Human Rights Accord was proposed by the National 
Human Rights Commission in May 2003. Its aim was to get 
both the government and the insurgents to abide by human 
rights standards and agree to a monitoring process.  
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years to conduct a policy toward the king that has 
essentially been laissez-faire. Since October 2002 it 
has been waiting for him to deliver results. 
But for all the tough rhetoric, the king has presided over 
a decline in the state's reach and capacity even more 
precipitous than that managed by several ineffective 
democratic governments. Waiting longer for the situation 
to develop will only hasten the growth of a dangerous 
power vacuum in Kathmandu. If Nepal's friends wish 
to salvage the prospects of a stable, democratic and 
prosperous country, the time to act is now. 
Kathmandu/Brussels. 24 February 2005 
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practical recommendations targeted at key international 
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, 
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct 
regular update on the state of play in all the most 
significant situations of conflict or potential conflict 
around the world. 
Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and printed copy to officials in 
foreign ministries and international organisations and 
made available simultaneously on the website, 
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with 
governments and those who influence them, including 
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate 
support for its policy prescriptions. 
The Crisis Group Board -- which includes prominent 
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business 
and the media -- is directly involved in helping to bring 
the reports and recommendations to the attention of 
senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is 
co-chaired by Leslie H. Gelb, former President of the 
Council on Foreign Relations, and Lord Patten of Barnes, 
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Cairo, Dakar, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, 
Nairobi, Osh, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Pristina, Quito, 
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Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; 
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Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable 
foundations, companies and individual donors. The 
following governmental departments and agencies 
currently provide funding: Agence Intergouvernementale 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
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Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish 
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Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic 
Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford 
Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William 
& Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation 
Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John 
Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open 
Society Institute, David and Lucile Packard Foundation, 
Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace 
Foundation, Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community 
Endowment Fund, United States Institute of Peace and 
Fundação Oriente. 
February 2005 
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org 
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Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Kenya 
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Trifun Kostovski 
Member of Parliament, Macedonia; founder 
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Elliott F. Kulick 
Chairman, Pegasus International, U.S. 
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman 
Novelist and journalist, U.S. 
Todung Mulya Lubis 
Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia 
Barbara McDougall 
Former Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
Canada 
Ayo Obe 
Chair of Steering Committee of World 
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Christine Ockrent 
Journalist and author, France 
Friedbert Pflüger 
Foreign Policy Spokesman of the CDU/CSU 
Parliamentary Group in the German 
Bundestag 
Victor M Pinchuk 
Member of Parliament, Ukraine; founder of 
Interpipe Scientific and Industrial Production 
Group  
Surin Pitsuwan 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand 
Itamar Rabinovich 
President of Tel Aviv University; former 
Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. and Chief 
Negotiator with Syria 
Fidel V. Ramos 
Former President of the Philippines 
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen 
Former Secretary General of NATO; former 
Defence Secretary, UK 
Mohamed Sahnoun 
 Special Adviser to the United Nations 
Secretary-General on Africa 
Ghassan Salamé 
Former Minister Lebanon, Professor of 
International Relations, Paris 
Salim A. Salim 
Former Prime Minister of Tanzania; former 
Secretary General of the Organisation of 
African Unity  
Douglas Schoen 
Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland 
Associates, U.S. 
Pär Stenbäck 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland 
Thorvald Stoltenberg 
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway 
Grigory Yavlinsky 
Chairman of Yabloko Party and its Duma 
faction, Russia 
Uta Zapf 
Chairperson of the German Bundestag 
Subcommittee on Disarmament, Arms Control 
and Non-proliferation 
Ernesto Zedillo 
Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale 
Center for the Study of Globalization 
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